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Should	the	UK	choose	the	‘Norway	model’,	it	would
still	be	subject	to	the	jurisdiction	of	a	foreign	court
Many	commentators	consider	the	EEA	to	be	the	best	option	for	Brexit	when	it	comes	to	financial
services.	However,	access	to	the	financial	markets	through	the	EEA	Agreement	would	not	come
for	free,	argues	Øyvind	Bø.	He	writes	that	EFTA	Court’s	judgments	are	one	of	the	fundamental
pillars	of	the	EEA	Agreement,	in	a	similar	manner	that	the	European	Court	of	Justice	ensures	the
application	and	enforcement	of	EU	law.	Should	the	UK	join	the	EEA	(Norway	model),	it	would	still
be	subject	to	the	jurisdiction	of	an	international	court,	he	explains.
On	March	13,	the	LSE	Brexit	blog	published	an	article	by	Morten	Kinander,	in	which	he	argues
that	the	UK	will	not	be	able	to	negotiate	better	access	to	the	financial	services	market	than	Norway	and	that	it	should
be	careful	about	ditching	the	EEA	alternative.	I	agree	with	the	main	points	of	his	analysis	that	access	to	the	EU’s
financial	markets	is	a	matter	of	law	and	not	politics.	After	the	emergence	of	EU’s	financial	supervisory	system,	it	will
be	extremely	difficult	for	the	UK	to	gain	passporting	rights	to	the	European	financial	markets	without	allowing
supranational	supervision.	The	Norway	option	is	probably	as	good	as	it	gets,	and	it	gives	Norway	passporting	rights
and	rights	to	participate	in	the	relevant	meetings	of	the	European	system	of	financial	supervision,	(ESAs)	although
without	voting	rights.
However,	I	do	not	agree	with	all	of	Morten	Kinander’s	claims	about	the	advantages	of	the	EEA	model.	If	the	UK	opts
for	the	EEA	alternative,	he	claims	that	it	will	not	be	bound	by	the	EFTA	Court,	because	its	decisions	are	advisory.
This	sounds	appealing,	but	as	a	general	statement,	it	is	incorrect.
Like	the	European	Court	of	Justice,	the	EFTA	Court	has	jurisdiction	in	cases	concerningits	member	states’
compliance	with	their	obligations	under	the	EEA	Agreement.	If	Norway	fails	to	comply	with	its	obligations	under	the
EEA	Agreement,	the	EFTA	Surveillance	Authority	may	bring	an	action	against	the	government	of	Norway	before	the
EFTA	Court.	Such	cases	are	regularly	brought,	and	every	year	the	EFTA	Court	hands	down	several	judgments
concerning	the	EFTA	States’	failure	to	comply	with	their	obligations	under	the	EEA	Agreement	and	secondary
legislation.
CC0	Public	Domain
LSE Brexit: Should the UK choose the ‘Norway model’, it would still be subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign court Page 1 of 3
	
	
Date originally posted: 2018-03-27
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/03/27/should-the-uk-choose-the-norway-model-it-would-still-be-subject-to-the-jurisdiction-of-an-international-court/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/
The	binding	effect	of	the	EFTA	Court’s	judgments	is	one	of	the	fundamental	pillars	of	the	EEA	Agreement,	as	it
ensures	the	application	and	enforcement	of	EEA	law	in	the	EFTA	States	in	a	similar	manner	as	the	European	Court
of	Justice	ensures	the	application	and	enforcement	of	EU	law	in	its	member	states.	There	is	no	doubt	about	the
binding	effect	of	these	judgments,	which	is	clearly	set	out	in	Article	33	of	the	Surveillance	and	Court	Agreement.	The
EFTA	Court	has	even	handed	down	a	judgment	concerning	Norway’s	failure	to	comply	with	its	judgments	(case	E-
4/16).
The	EFTA	States	consider	themselves	bound	by	the	judgments	of	the	EFTA	Court.	Even	though	they	may	not
succeed	in	complying	with	the	judgments	within	the	relevant	deadline,	it	is	unthinkable	that	an	EFTA	State	would
openly	refuse	to	comply	with	the	judgments	of	the	EFTA	Court.	The	fact	that	the	EFTA	Court	cannot	impose	fines	for
non-compliance	with	its	judgments	is	therefore	of	less	importance.
In	certain	fields,	there	are	special	rules	about	the	EFTA	Court’s	jurisdiction.	In	the	field	of	competition,	for	example,
the	judgments	from	the	EFTA	Court	have	an	immediate	effect	in	the	national	legal	systems	of	the	EFTA	States,	and
the	EFTA	Court	has	powers	of	judicial	review	in	the	field	of	financial	services.
In	addition	to	its	judgments,	the	EFTA	Court	hands	down	advisory	opinions,	which	correspond	to	the	preliminary
rulings	of	the	Court	of	Justice.	These	opinions	are	not	binding.	Although	important,	the	significance	of	the	non-
binding	nature	of	these	decisions	should	not	be	exaggerated.
If	the	States	do	not	comply	with	the	interpretation	of	EEA	law	set	out	in	the	advisory	opinions,	the	EFTA	Surveillance
Authority	may	bring	an	action	against	them	in	the	EFTA	Court	for	failure	to	comply	with	the	rules	interpreted	in	the
opinions.	When,	in	turn,	the	EFTA	Court	decides	whether	or	not	the	States	have	complied	with	their	obligations,	it
would	be	no	surprise	if	it	decides	to	apply	the	interpretation	expressed	in	its	advisory	opinion.	Arguably,	the	EFTA
States	are	therefore	indirectly	bound	to	apply	the	interpretation	expressed	in	the	advisory	opinions	of	the	EFTA
Court.
More	importantly,	national	courts	in	the	EFTA	States	are	not	obliged	to	apply	the	EFTA	Court’s	advisory	opinions.
Nevertheless,	this	has	a	very	limited	impact	on	the	overall	enforcement	of	EEA	law	in	the	EFTA	States.	Firstly,
national	courts	in	the	EFTA	States	are	obliged	to	enforce	EEA	law,	just	like	their	counterparts	in	the	EU	Member
States	must	enforce	EU	law.	Secondly,	the	vast	majority	of	cases	litigated	before	national	courts	are	decided	upon
without	the	involvement	of	the	courts	in	Luxembourg.	Thus,	the	practical	importance	of	the	advisory	nature	of	the
EFTA	Court’s	opinions	is	more	limited	than	it	would	seem.
Highlighting	the	non-binding	nature	of	the	advisory	opinions	from	the	EFTA	Court	without	explaining	the	context
exaggerates	the	differences	between	the	respective	roles	of	the	European	Court	of	Justice	and	the	EFTA	Court.	The
fact	that	the	advisory	opinions	are	not	binding	does	not	imply	that	the	UK	in	the	EEA	would	not	need	to	be	subject	to
the	jurisdiction	of	an	international	court.
***
Morten	Kinander	also	addresses	the	set-up	of	the	financial	supervisory	authorities	(ESAs)	in	the	EEA	Agreement.	In
that	set-up,	the	EFTA	States	are	subject	to	the	supervision	of	the	ESAs	as	a	matter	of	fact.	However,	he	argues	that
the	EFTA	States	are	not	subject	to	the	supervision	of	the	ESAs	as	a	matter	of	formality	because	the	EFTA
Surveillance	Authority	is	under	no	legal	duty	to	adopt	the	decisions	drafted	by	the	ESAs.	I	think	the	latter	issue	is
debatable.
Annex	IX	to	the	EEA	Agreement	states	that	whenever	the	ESAs	issue	draft	decisions	to	the	EFTA	Surveillance
Authority,	the	latter	“shall,	without	undue	delay”	adopt	the	relevant	decision.	The	wording	clearly	suggests	that	the
EFTA	Surveillance	Authority	is	under	a	legal	duty	to	adopt	a	decision	whenever	the	ESAs	issue	a	draft.	Arguably,	the
role	of	the	EFTA	Surveillance	Authority	is	to	adapt	the	draft,	which	has	been	drafted	within	the	framework	of	the	EU,
to	the	framework	of	the	EEA	Agreement,	and	not	to	reconsider	the	underlying	substance	of	the	decision.
As	Morten	Kinander	explains,	this	question	is	of	constitutional	significance	in	Norway,	but	it	is	also	of	limited	practical
interest,	as	the	EFTA	Surveillance	Authority	will	most	likely	adopt	any	decision	proposed	by	the	ESAs.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
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Øyvind	Bø,	Cand.jur.,	LL.M	(King’s	College	London)	has	previously	worked	at	the	EFTA	Surveillance	Authority	and
the	EFTA	Secretariat.	He	is	currently	Judge	at	the	National	Insurance	Court	in	Norway.
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